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What is grandfathering?
Carl Knight*
Department of Politics, University of Glasgow, UK, and Faculty of Humanities, University
of Johannesburg, South Africa
Emissions grandfathering maintains that prior emissions increase future
emission entitlements. The view forms a large part of actual emission
control frameworks, but is routinely dismissed by political theorists and
applied philosophers as evidently unjust. A sympathetic theoretical
reconsideration of grandfathering suggests that the most plausible version
is moderate, allowing that other considerations should influence emission
entitlements, and be justified on instrumental grounds. The most promising
instrumental justification defends moderate grandfathering on the basis
that one extra unit of emission entitlements from a baseline of zero
emissions increases welfare to a greater extent where it is assigned to a high
emitter than where it is assigned to a low emitter. Moderate grandfathering
can be combined with basic needs and ability to pay considerations to
provide an attractive approach to allocating emission entitlements.
Keywords: Climate change; emission rights; grandfathering; utilitarianism;
welfare
Introduction
There is a notable divide between the allocations of emission rights selected by
political actors on the one hand, and the allocations defended by political
theorists and applied philosophers on the other. This divide is largely
explicable in terms of grandfathering, the view that prior emissions increase
entitlements to future emissions. Actual allocations of emissions rights, such as
the Kyoto Protocol and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), typically
include a significant element of grandfathering, as indeed do more practically-
orientated proposals such as Contraction and Convergence. Yet theorists are
dismissive of grandfathering (Caney 2009, 2011, Moellendorf 2009, Meyer and
Roser 2010), instead focusing on principles which are indifferent to prior
emissions, or which treat them as decreasing entitlements (Jagers and Duus-
Otterstro¨m 2008, Page 2008, Shue 2010, Duus-Otterstro¨m and Jagers 2011).
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Undoubtedly self-interest, or the perception of it, plays a major role in
political decision-making here as elsewhere. But might there be something to be
said for grandfathering? We need to get a clearer sense of what grandfathering
actually is, for the bare notion described above can be fleshed out in many
ways. For instance, theorists often seem inclined to understand grandfathering
in a stronger sense than do political actors, and that might partially explain
divergent attitudes towards it.
I explore grandfathering from a theoretical but sympathetic perspective,
considering the various ways in which it might be construed with the aim of
arriving at its most favourable formulation. While many forms of grand-
fathering – including those familiar from international agreements – are
evidently implausible, there is a form of grandfathering that should be taken
more seriously by theory than has been the case to date. The divide between
theory and practice should undoubtedly be closed by practice moving closer to
theory, but there is one practically small but theoretically significant regard in
which theory has something to learn from practice.
I begin by considering several versions of grandfathering and the
justifications that can be given for them.
Which grandfathering?
Strength
Grandfathering requires that past emissions strengthen the claim for future
entitlements. More specifically, it holds that agents are entitled to emit the
same percentage of total emissions as they previously emitted (Paterson 1996,
pp. 184–185).
What, then, is the appropriate strength of the claim made by grand-
fathering, so construed? Consider first a strong version of grandfathering.
Simon Caney (2009, p. 127) describes grandfathering as having two
stipulations: ‘first, that the fair share of emissions for any actor should be a
function of its past share of emissions and, second, that these emission rights
should be handed out free of charge to these actors’. I take this as suggesting
that, according to grandfathering, nothing other than past emissions should be
taken into account when establishing emissions entitlements.
Strong grandfathering is evidently implausible as a distributive principle.
If applied globally it would deny poor countries the development necessary to
meet their citizens’ basic needs (Caney 2009, p. 128, 2011, p. 88, Moellendorf
2009, p. 117, Schuppert 2011, pp. 309–310). Furthermore, strong grand-
fathering has not had much impact on policy. The Kyoto Protocol is
considered by Caney and others to accommodate grandfathering, as it
focuses on percentage emission limitations and reductions amongst rich
Annex I countries. But Kyoto only approximately ties Annex I countries’
prior emissions to future entitlements; Iceland and Australia were ‘limited’ to
110% and 108% of 1990 emission levels, while most had to make reductions
to 92% of 1990 levels (United Nations 1998, Appendix B). Furthermore, it
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does not place limitations or reductions on poor signatories’ emissions.
Kyoto thus appears to embody a view that the fair share of emissions is not
purely a matter of past emissions in the way that strong grandfathering
suggests. Similarly, the first two stages of the ETS required that member
states hand out a large majority, but not all, of its emission allowances (at
least 95% for 2005–2007, and at least 90% for 2008–2012) free of charge to
emitting businesses (European Parliament and Council of the European
Union 2003, Article 10). As a small but growing percentage of allowances
have been auctioned, it is clear that the ETS also does not reflect strong
grandfathering.
It is possible, then, to identify less strong versions of grandfathering. Weak
grandfathering merely says that all else being equal prior emissions strengthen
the claim to future emissions. The ceteris paribus clause reduces grandfathering
to the status of a tiebreaker, so we can set this view aside.
Moderate grandfathering holds that an agent’s past emissions provide a pro
tanto reason for future emissions entitlements to be granted to that agent. A
pro tanto reason for something supports that thing, whatever (possibly stronger
and countervailing) other reasons apply. If I get a thrill from every act of
gambling, I have a pro tanto reason to accept any gamble, though all things
considered there are many gambles I should decline. Moderate grandfathering
is a stronger position than weak grandfathering in that it insists that
grandfathering considerations are always relevant to distribution, not only
when other considerations tie. But unlike strong grandfathering, moderate
grandfathering does not require that grandfathering considerations are the only
considerations that influence entitlements (except for tiebreakers).
It is moderate grandfathering rather than the strong view which appears to
be assumed by the Kyoto Protocol and the ETS, as although they base
entitlements to some extent on prior emissions, other considerations also
influence their entitlements. It also appears to be assumed by more radical
schemes. In the Contraction and Convergence model, ‘[t]he international
sharing of this [emissions] budget as ‘‘entitlements’’ results from a negotiable
rate of linear convergence to equal shares per person globally by an agreed
date’ (Global Commons Institute 2012). As prior emissions are taken as the
starting point, higher emitters have greater entitlements during convergence,
but not to the extent that they are higher emitters, as high emitters experience a
marked decrease in emissions that low emitters do not.
Moderate grandfathering has, then, been most relevant to policy. As it
lacks the obvious implausibility of strong grandfathering and the triviality of
weak grandfathering, it is moderate grandfathering with which I shall be
concerned.
The future
The next questions concern the temporal extension of grandfathering. First,
how far forwards does grandfathering go?
Environmental Politics 3
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One might defend grandfathering as part of an ongoing state of affairs.
More often it is considered as a transitional principle for moving from the
status quo to some other state of affairs – most often, some more equal state of
affairs considered to be fairer (Gosseries 2005, pp. 300–301, Caney 2009, pp.
128–129, 2011, pp. 88–89). The plausibility of these views depends to some
extent on the level on which we intend to justify grandfathering. If
grandfathering were held to be intrinsically just, there would seem to be no
cut-off point at which grandfathering would cease to be relevant.
Grandfathering is, however, most plausibly construed as only instrumentally
valuable (see below). In that case, grandfathering will cease to be valuable as
soon as it stops serving the fundamental value that it happens to serve. But it is
possible, theoretically at least, that grandfathering will always serve the
fundamental value, in which case grandfathering will always be appropriate.
Thus an instrumental justification seems to be consistent with either a per-
manent or transitional version of grandfathering, depending on the relevant
facts.
The past
The second temporal issue concerns how far back grandfathering goes. It uses
some past emissions as the basis for future entitlements, but does not itself
establish which past emissions. Does it consider only levels of emissions in a
particular year, or emissions in the lifetimes of the individuals involved, or all
emissions made during the existence of the states involved?
We can quickly dismiss the last possibility. It is not practically relevant, is
not discussed in the theoretical literature, and is not appropriate. I take the
cosmopolitan view that the individual is the ultimate moral unit. While, in
practice, individualistic goals may be served derivatively by assigning emission
rights to countries, it seems evidently unjust to base individuals’ entitlements
on the actions of their long-dead ancestors.
Where this issue is addressed at all, most theorists seem to assume that
emissions in a particular base year are what matters for grandfathering, as
international agreements also often assume (Gosseries 2005, p. 297,Moellendorf
2009, p. 117). This assumption is grounded more on customs of official data
collection and presentation than on anything taken to be morally significant
about years. There is no significant moral difference between what happened 364
days ago and what happened 365 days ago. Yet if the past year is the base year,
the former is treated as fully distributively significant and the latter as
distributively irrelevant. This could be practically significant if, for instance, a
cold country emitted an unusually small amount in the base year as that year was
unusually warm, and was thus given small entitlements, even though subsequent
years were colder, and those entitlements thus inadequate. We should avoid a
view which assigns moral weight to temporal segments arbitrarily.
As it lacks this arbitrariness, a focus on lifetime emissions has obvious
attractions. There is something morally important about when individuals’
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lives start and end, especially from a cosmopolitan perspective. But this view of
grandfathering faces a different problem. Consider that an adult population
averaging 50 years old may have emitted more in total than an adult
population of the same size averaging 40 years old, even though the 50-year-old
population has emitted less per year. Intuitively, grandfathering would give
greater entitlements to the 40 year olds, as they are higher emitters in what feels
like the relevant sense. Indeed, that is why the base year view of grandfathering
seems prima facie plausible, because the record of the past year, if it is
representative, will show that the 40 year olds had higher emissions. I therefore
suggest that grandfathering issues entitlements in proportion to average
emissions per year of life. This avoids the problem of the base year view, in that
no arbitrary weight is placed on what happened in a particular year, without
falling into the trap of treating aged low emitters as high emitters.
Why grandfathering?
Prudential justification
Often grandfathering appears to be simply assumed as a component of
emissions distribution schemes. Rich countries usually do not explain why their
favoured schemes include significant grandfathering elements. Presumably the
main rationale is national self-interest, or perhaps a more narrow self-interest
in securing votes, which in turn results from high-emission path dependency.
But it would be misleading to suppose that these self-interested or prudential
rationales are the only available rationales. We can distinguish between three
moral accounts of the justificatory basis of grandfathering.
Realist justification
First, there is the realist justification of grandfathering. It suggests that, though
we might prefer the world to be such that grandfathering was not required, in
practice the only way to get high-emission countries to sign up to a climate
change deal and bring about the required global reduction is to accommodate
their self-interest by grandfathering some or all of their emissions (Posner and
Weisbach 2010). The realist justification is a response to the adoption of the
prudential rationale by developed countries, but unlike the prudential rationale
it has significant moral content. Even the most audacious advocates of national
interest do not argue that pursuit of their countries’ self-interest ought morally
to be a high priority for other countries. By contrast, realists can and do argue
that countries are obliged to make whatever agreement they can to reduce the
harmful effects of climate change.
This argument is firmly rooted in non-ideal theory, and relies upon the
threat of non-compliance with the requirements of justice by major emitters. It
seems scarcely credible as a general account of why grandfathering might be
justified (cf. Nelson 2011). While it might be morally permissible to accept the
only deal on the table for a significant reduction in emissions, that no more
Environmental Politics 5
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establishes the legitimacy of grandfathering deals than does the permissibility
of offering protection money when threatened justify extortion (Bovens 2011).
The realist justification is a plausible moral justification, but only of actions
taken under highly circumscribed circumstances, not of that circumscription
itself (Caney 2009, p. 129).
Fundamental justification
Consider the possibility of providing grandfathering with a fundamental
justification: of holding that grandfathering is intrinsically fair, for instance.
The most commonly mentioned argument of this type is libertarian, suggesting
that past emitters acquire emissions rights on account of their prior usage
(Wesley and Peterson 1999, pp. 186–188, Neumayer 2000, Soltau 2009, pp.
145–146). The most developed libertarian argument is presented by Luc
Bovens (2011), who first considers whether the atmosphere may be treated in
the same fashion as land, as initially having the status of a commons, which no
longer applies where the Lockean ‘as much, and as good’ proviso is no longer
met. Just as homesteading ceases at this point, so too does the acquisition of
claim rights on atmospheric absorption of greenhouse gases. However, Bovens
notes that this would be clearly unfair even on the best Lockean view. The
Lockean proviso should be applied continuously, he believes, and would be
violated by many emissions by putative rights holders as they would prevent
those without a history of emissions from having as much and as good.
Furthermore, on Bovens’ account, these internal considerations are supple-
mented by external considerations which also tell against acquisition of
emission rights through usage, such as equality and utility – as, we might add,
moderate grandfathering allows.
While Bovens’ view limits the impact of the initial acquisition of emissions
rights, it still makes them the ‘proper starting point’. This is problematic.
Rights to initial acquisition, which have initial intuitive support because they
are equally held by all, lose that support when we consider current and future
generations. They are excluded from such rights because there is nothing left in
common to acquire. Their entitlements are influenced by what they inherit, for
which they can claim no credit. Absent redistribution to effectively undo the
effects of the initial acquisition, we will not be giving ‘the same kinds of right to
all individuals as were enjoyed by those licensed to make the ‘‘first moves’’’
(Steiner 1977, p. 151). The (right) libertarian approach has little appeal, even as
part of a pluralistic view, once its implicit assumptions are spelt out. The
problem is not with Bovens’ ingenious extension of the approach to encompass
emission rights, but with the very core of the approach.
Instrumental justification
A final approach holds that circumstances are such that grandfathering may be
justified on account of its support of some other intrinsic value or values. These
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instrumental views are intermediate in justificatory terms in that grandfathering
is not seen as intrinsically valuable, yet the justification for it does not crucially
rely on non-compliance. The basic instrumentalist idea is that it just so happens
that grandfathering makes things better in some significant regard than any
alternative.
One instrumental argument suggests that special relationships justify
individuals in rich countries resisting climate change mitigation burdens
imposed on compatriots that are not also imposed on poor countries’ citizens
(Wesley and Peterson 1999, pp. 178–179). By accident rather than design, that
would give greater emission rights to those with greater historical emissions.
But this grants a dubious fundamental value to special relationships (Wesley
and Peterson 1999, pp. 181–186). It is, furthermore, problematic in its own
terms, since it would also justify poor countries’ citizens insisting upon equal
emission rights for compatriots, contra grandfathering.
Nevertheless, providing an instrumental moral justification for grand-
fathering is the most promising approach. I will later spell out a specific such
justification, but first mention a general consideration that puts this approach
in a more favourable light than its main rival, fundamental justification.
There is nothing morally appealing about greenhouse gas emissions. Even if
we were convinced by the general shape of libertarian justifications for
property, Bovens’ extension of that justification to carbon emissions would
raise doubts about our overall allegiance to libertarianism. That pumping out
carbon should, intrinsically and regardless of its effects, increase entitlements
would be a reductio of that view. Emissions just do not seem intrinsically
entitlement-granting.
There is, by contrast, nothing troubling about the thought that carbon
emissions might increase entitlements for instrumental reasons. Suppose, for
instance, that in thousands of years’ time humans are threatened by a new ice
age, and science says that increased carbon emissions are our best bet for
averting catastrophe. In such circumstances, we might incentivise agents to
increase emissions, and giving more entitlements to high emitters would be just.
We are, of course, in a very different situation. But this example suggests that
an instrumental justification can be made to work, if only the facts fit.
An argument for grandfathering
Marginal costs
Which facts might combine with principles to generate a plausible argument
for grandfathering? Costs appear relevant. High emitters rely on their high
emissions. The industries of high-emitting countries require electricity on a
huge scale, and their power stations use fossil fuels. In these countries
individuals often need cars to get to work, and have developed preferences
based around a high level of consumption. Thus, if high emitters are to cut
their emissions, as dangerous climate change requires, they will face costs.
Those costs are morally important.
Environmental Politics 7
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Low emitters also face costs when cutting emissions. To reach an argument
for grandfathering, we need a way of assessing the moral importance of costs
relative to other costs. Several welfarist principles could provide the relevant
assessment. On welfarist views such as utilitarianism, the relevant costs are
welfare costs, rather than the monetary marginal abatement costs familiar from
economics. According to utilitarianism, welfare costs are more important the
greater they are.
It might be claimed that high emitters face high marginal abatement costs.
The marginal abatement cost is the welfare cost of one extra unit of emissions
reduction. Thus, the main claim of the marginal cost argument is:
one extra unit of emission reductions from a baseline of actual prior emissions
decreases welfare to a greater extent where it is assigned to a high emitter than
where it is assigned to a low emitter.
If this is correct, utilitarianism will maintain that high emitters have greater
entitlements, as this will save them – and the global economy – from the severe
effects of deeper cuts (cf. Wesley and Peterson 1999, p. 186).
There are two serious problems with this as an argument for grand-
fathering. If it succeeded, it would seem, in a way, too successful. It would
require that high emitters had not merely entitlements in proportion to their
prior emissions, but entitlements disproportionately large relative to their prior
emissions. Suppose that a high emitter emitted 6 tonnes, a low emitter 3 tonnes,
and it was agreed that they had to cut their combined emissions to 6 tonnes.
Their initial welfare levels are identical. Assuming that the higher emitter has
higher marginal costs, assigning entitlements in proportion to prior emissions,
and thus giving the high emitter 4 tonnes and the low emitter 2 tonnes, is
insufficient to maximise welfare. Though such a policy gives greater
entitlements to the higher emitter, it still requires the higher emitter to make
twice the cuts of the low emitter (2 tonnes versus 1 tonne). But this is at odds
with the marginal cost argument, which assumes that a tonne of cuts from the
higher emitter is more costly than a tonne of cuts from the low emitter. On that
assumption the rational utilitarian policy is to allocate more cuts to the low
emitter, where they will be less costly. The high emitter would end up with a
share of entitlements greater than her share of prior emissions. Thus the
argument proposes something in excess of grandfathering.
The second problem is that it is highly improbable that the argument works
empirically. This can not be resolved simply by examining official data, as we
are concerned with welfare costs, not monetary costs, and even the latter are
unreliable in practice given the incentives governments have for overstating
marginal abatement costs. It does not seem intuitively credible that those who
emit most suffer the most from each lost chunk of emissions. Among the global
rich, it is highly probable that higher emitters have more ‘low hanging fruit’ –
cheap and straightforward energy efficiencies that have already been enacted
by the lower emitting rich. The lower emitting rich, by contrast, would
generally have to dig deeper, and suffer greater expense, to find further energy
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savings. The marginal cost argument is thus very unlikely to succeed, and
would not really establish grandfathering if it did.
Marginal benefits
An important relative of the marginal cost argument shifts focus from the costs
agents face for each unit of reduced emissions to the benefits agents gain from
each unit of extra entitlements.
The focus on benefits, like that on costs, has the advantage of being
concerned with facts that are intuitively of great instrumental importance. But
these foci are far from equivalent. The baseline for the cost argument is the
prior level of emissions, while the baseline for the benefit argument is zero
emissions. The cost argument is concerned with cuts to its baseline, but the
benefit argument is concerned with additions to its baseline. The benefit
argument thus does not rely on recasting the problem as one of ‘burden
sharing’, or settling on an appropriate level of reductions, as do some defences
of grandfathering. It starts from a clean slate, seeing all emissions as available
for distribution, and rejects an assumption commonly associated with
grandfathering (Meyer and Roser 2006, p. 229). Ironically, the change to a
zero emissions baseline is decisive for the effectiveness of the new argument for
grandfathering.
Where the baseline is the prior level of emissions, the bulk of those
emissions is taken for granted, so the cost of losing it is not considered. The
cost argument only appeals to the cost to high emitters of losing one unit of
emissions; as we have seen, that cost is not high enough to generate a good case
for grandfathering. By contrast, where the baseline is zero, prior levels of
emissions are not assumed as the starting point, so the cost of losing the
majority of emissions is foregrounded. Thus the benefit argument can appeal to
the cost to high emitters of losing many units of emissions – a potentially very
high cost.
The claim made by the marginal benefit argument is this:
one extra unit of emission entitlements from a baseline of zero increases welfare to
a greater extent where it is assigned to a high emitter than where it is assigned to a
low emitter.
This claim is that high emitters have higher marginal benefits from
entitlements than do low emitters. How plausible is this? What reason is there
for thinking that high emitters would gain more from entitlements than would
low emitters?
The reason is the basic idea referred to earlier: high emitters’ reliance on
their high emissions. Low emitters are also reliant on their own emissions, but
their emissions are lower. So from a baseline of no emission entitlements, there
is good reason for thinking that high emitters would benefit more from each
available entitlement. This means that they get more entitlements on a
utilitarian scheme.
Environmental Politics 9
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Reconsider two variations on the example where a high emitter emitted 6
tonnes, a low emitter emitted 3 tonnes, and they had identical initial welfare
levels. In the first variant, it is agreed that combined emissions must be reduced
not to 6 tonnes, as in the original case, but to 5 tonnes. Assuming that emission
entitlements are not tradable after the initial allocation, the high emitter will
typically have a stronger interest in securing each extra tonne of entitlements
than will the low emitter. This is not as obvious for the first few tonnes of
entitlements to be assigned, as the low emitter is also concerned to secure a
certain level of emission entitlements. But if each agent has 2 tonnes of
entitlements, the welfare benefit of securing the fifth and final tonne is greater
for the high emitter than for the low emitter because, if that tonne is not
secured by the high emitter, they will have to reduce their emissions from 6
tonnes to 2 tonnes, a massive two-thirds cut which is likely to impose a severe
welfare penalty. If the low emitter does not secure that tonne, they will only
have to reduce their emissions by a more manageable one-third from 3 tonnes
to 2.
A similar but even clearer result is recorded in the second variant of the
case, in which combined emissions are a more generous 7 tonnes. Assuming
that 3 tonnes have been assigned to each agent already, the low emitter has a
very weak interest in securing the final tonne – they can carry on emitting as
they could before even without it, so it offers little or no benefit. But the high
emitter has a strong interest even in the final tonne, which entails cutting their
emissions by one-third, rather than by half without it. The utilitarian is
sensitive to differences in the magnitudes of benefits that individuals get from
extra emissions, and so will generally assign greater emission rights to higher
emitters.
There is not necessarily a linear relationship between the level of prior
emissions and the benefits from increased entitlements – indeed, higher emitters
can usually make cuts more easily than low emitters. Emissions are likely to
have diminishing marginal returns. The upshot is that, while high emitters will
generally benefit from extra emissions to some greater extent than low emitters,
this extent falls short of the extent to which they are higher emitters. This is
sufficient for moderate grandfathering to be justified, as it allows for
grandfathering considerations to be balanced against other considerations,
such as those to do with high emitters’ ‘low hanging fruit’.
The marginal benefit argument actually implies that, pace the marginal cost
argument, a unit of cuts has greater cost for low emitters than it does for high
emitters. If the high emitter of the previous case were allowed 4 tonnes of
emissions, and the low emitter 3 tonnes, that is a cut of 2 tonnes for the high
emitter and no cut at all for the low emitter. For it to be sensible to assign all
the cuts to the high emitter, it must be the case that each unit of cuts for her is
less costly than each unit of cuts for the low emitter. The marginal benefit
argument holds that (relative to prior emissions) cuts are less costly for high
emitters, but that (relative to a baseline of zero entitlements) entitlements bring
greater benefits to high emitters. It thus rejects the implausible empirical claim
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made by the marginal benefit argument, and relies on a much weaker and more
credible claim.
Some major welfarist principles other than utilitarianism can also support
moderate grandfathering. In the foregoing case, it seems highly probable that
the high emitter will need to be assigned more emissions than the low emitter in
order for the former’s welfare level to be as high as that of the latter. Since they
started with identical welfare levels, leaving the low emitter’s emissions
unchanged while making radical cuts to the high emitter’s would almost
certainly make the high emitter worse off than the low emitter. Thus, welfare
egalitarianism, which is concerned with minimising welfare inequalities, and
welfare prioritarianism, which is concerned with maximising the position of the
worst off, can serve in place of the utilitarian component of the marginal cost
argument.
Challenges
Basic needs
In my examples, the welfare levels of high emitters and low emitters were equal.
The basic needs challenge suggests that assigning greater emission entitlements
to higher emitters is a recipe for injustice in the real, unequal world. These
entitlements will only allow them greater access to luxuries, to which they have
no right, while increased entitlements for low emitters may allow them to
secure basic needs (Agarwal and Narain 1991, Shue 1993). There can be no
utilitarian, egalitarian, or prioritarian basis for denying some bare necessities
for the sake of others’ extravagance.
The marginal benefit argument suggests only that high emitters have more
entitlements than low emitters, by virtue of being high emitters. It does not
justify the present massive inequality in emissions. High emitters could be given
more entitlements than low emitters without any threat to the latter’s basic
needs. If rich countries massively reduced their emissions to a little above the
global average, that would leave plenty of room for growth in developing
world emission while giving high emitters the higher entitlement that the
marginal benefit argument seemingly supports.
Furthermore, the marginal benefit argument does not actually require that
high emitters have greater entitlements than low emitters at all where they differ
in other regards. It says that higher emissions increase entitlements, but allows
that, on other grounds, high emitters are due decreased entitlements. In
particular, higher emitters tend to be richer than lower emitters, and it is likely
that their entitlements will be reduced on that account. One reason for this is
implicit in the objection: luxuries are less morally important than basic needs.
Moderate grandfathering can recognise this. Securing basic needs is more
morally important than providing luxuries according to egalitarianism,
prioritarianism, and, on account of diminishing marginal utility, utilitarianism
(see Singer 2010, p. 194). The marginal benefit argument, which appeals to
these theories, says only that the final allocation of entitlements should reflect
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one sort of often overlooked welfare consideration, a consideration which
supports the claims of high emitters. It does not deny that there may be other,
weightier considerations which mean that, all things considered, wealthy high
emitters are due less than poor low emitters.
Luxuries
I mentioned that emissions are morally unappealing, and this is especially true
of luxury emissions. Although my argument has the advantage of providing
only an instrumental basis for past emissions increasing future entitlements, it
may still seem objectionable that prior luxury emissions get legitimated or
rewarded at all, especially given that in the real world these emissions might
endanger basic needs. Call this the luxuries challenge.
In response, the marginal benefit argument does not legitimate prior luxury
emissions. It takes no stance on the legitimacy of prior emissions. As Garret
Cullity (2004, p. 254, n. 7) has remarked in the related context of the rich
engaging in expensive activities against the backdrop of global poverty:
it could be defensible to continue pursuing activities that it was indefensible to
have embarked on. Presumably, for all of us there were alternative, cheaper ways
of structuring our lives that would have been no worse for us had we chosen them
when we were younger. But although it would not have been substantially worse
for us to have chosen a different path in the past, it may be substantially worse for
us to do so now.
Likewise, it might be defensible to ease the transition from prior high-emitting
activities, given that high emitters will suffer significant costs from a sudden
transition.
Similarly, by the logic of the marginal benefit argument, it does not reward
previous emissions. The argument takes welfarism as its starting point, and if
one is a welfarist, one does not think that providing an agent with an above-
average level of emission entitlements in order to sustain an average level of
welfare is any reward: the agent receives only as much of what matters as
somebody with a below average level of emission entitlements and the same
average welfare level. The critic might object that welfare is not really what
matters, and that on the measure that matters here (resources, or some subset
of them, such as emission permits) high emitters are rewarded, but by that
point the critic has burdened themselves with a much stronger and less
obviously appealing notion than the simple anti-luxury emission intuition they
started out with.
Inequalities
The arguments I have presented for grandfathering assumed equal welfare
levels. While it may seem true that, from a zero baseline, an extra tonne of
emissions will typically promote welfare best where assigned to the higher
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emitter among those initially equal in welfare levels, it does not follow that an
extra tonne of emissions will typically promote welfare best where assigned to
the higher emitter among those initially unequal in welfare levels. According to
the inequalities challenge, the marginal benefit argument is practically
irrelevant, given the present scale of global inequalities, as it does not apply
in unequal circumstances.1
There are two effective responses to the inequalities challenge. If, where
emissions are allocated in a situation of initial welfare equality, an unequal
distribution to the benefit of the higher emitter best promotes welfare, where
we introduce a third agent, who is very low in emissions and welfare, we still
have good reason, when it comes to distribution between high welfare agents, to
assign more emission entitlements to the higher emitter. Suppose that the high
emitter emits 6 tonnes and the low emitter 3 tonnes as before, but that in
addition the third agent emits 1 tonne and has much lower welfare. Overall
emissions are to be cut to 9 tonnes. Let us suppose that the third agent would
benefit from and is due 2 tonnes of entitlements, but would not benefit from
having more than 2 tonnes of entitlements. We are still left with the question of
how to allocate the remaining 7 tonnes of emission entitlements between the
two equally well-off parties. As the lower emitter can emit as much as they ever
have with only 3 tonnes, it seems clear that the higher emitter is due greater
emission entitlements, as grandfathering suggests.
The second response involves distribution between high and low welfare
agents. Suppose the high emitter is temporarily removed from the picture. Our
question is then how to allocate entitlements between an agent low in emissions
(3 tonnes) and high in welfare, and an agent very low in both emissions (1
tonnes) and welfare. Total emissions are to be reduced to 3 tonnes. As before,
we assume that a second tonne of emissions for the worse-off agent would
benefit them, but we stipulate that this is only a modest benefit and will not
secure basic needs, as they are already secured. Our question, then, is whether
to assign the third and final tonne to the worse-off agent, allowing them to
double their emissions, but from a very low initial welfare level, or instead
assign that tonne to the better-off agent, so they only have to cut emissions by
one-third, instead of two-thirds.
The correct course of action here will depend on further facts. What is
important, though, is that this choice is relevantly different from that in a case
in which we replace the low emissions (3 tonnes), high welfare agent with the
high emissions (6 tonnes), high welfare agent. The results of assigning the third
and final tonne to the worse off are, in the previous case, a modest benefit for
the worst off and a two-thirds emissions cut for the better off, and in this case,
the same benefit for the worst off but a more extreme five-sixths cut for the
better off. As the better off are equally well off in both cases, it seems clear that
the case for assigning the third and final tonne to the better-off agent is
stronger where that agent is a high emitter. All else being equal, we have more
reason to avoid imposing a five-sixths cut than we do a two-thirds cut, and here
all else (of moral relevance) is equal. Thus, even where two parties have
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different welfare levels, the marginal benefit argument, fully applied, strength-
ens the claims of each of them insofar as they are high emitters.
Economies
In the economies challenge2 the focus is on the ‘basic idea’ that high emitters are
reliant on their high emissions. The marginal benefit argument accepts that, in
light of this, some special accommodation for high emitters is appropriate. The
economies challenge disagrees. It says the appropriate response to high
emitting economies is not to reinforce their existing carbon ‘lock in’, as
grandfathering would, but to free them from it. The innovation and change of
national mindsets required for successful transition to low-carbon economies
would be undermined were high emitters qua higher emitters to receive
increased entitlements.
In response, moving to a low-carbon economy is an objective, but not a
road map. In the short term, the cuts have to fall somewhere. It is fanciful to
suppose that cuts, which must be large if we are to achieve our objective, will
not have short-term negative impacts, notwithstanding longer-term benefits.
From a baseline of zero, high emitters will typically benefit most from each
extra unit of emissions, so if we are concerned with promoting welfare (or the
interests of the worst off), we will give high emitters qua high emitters more
emission entitlements. There is then an argument for grandfathering, at least as
a transitional principle, even if we assume that, in the long run, we would be
better off in a low-carbon economy.
Application
Scope
The above argument suggests that higher emitters are, in one regard, due
higher emissions entitlements than lower emitters under any future emissions
deal within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) architecture. However, ascertaining the proper scope of this
proposal, even if it is accepted in principle, is not straightforward.
One question is whether, as a referee asked, ‘[t]he conditions of the world
currently are such that even thoughwe have a pro tanto reason to grandfather it is
swamped by other considerations, and thus not applicable’. This question may
seem to arise quite naturally from part of my response to the basic needs
challenge, which was, in essence, to accept that utilitarian or other welfarist
reasoning will treat basic needs considerations as generally outweighing grand-
fathering considerations. Indeed that response does impose restrictions of scope.
In particular, it follows that moderate grandfathering is unimportant when it
comes to setting the global level of emissions and the emission entitlements of
poorer countries. In considering these, basic needs are paramount.
This is not, however, the end of the story. My response to the basic needs
challenge takes many emissions off the table, as they are needed to satisfy basic
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needs, but there are others which are not needed to satisfy basic needs. This
second group of emissions is within the scope of grandfathering.
Distribution
Even non-subsistence emissions are not only subject to grandfathering.
Favouring those monetarily worse off seems justified by utilitarianism,
egalitarianism, and prioritarianism. This is a version of the ability to pay
principle, though the appeal of that view is often described as fundamental
(Shue 2010, p. 105). By contrast, income per capita is here relevant
instrumentally. Richer countries can be expected to have higher welfare levels
(though, importantly, not to the full extent that they are richer), and to be less
efficient converters of resources into welfare. Thus, for different instrumental
reasons, a country’s future non-subsistence emissions entitlement is greater the
greater its prior per capita emissions (as per the grandfathering consideration),
and the lower its per capita income (as per the ability to pay consideration).
How, then, to apply these considerations? First, grandfathering plays a
major role in settling the appropriate levels of emission reductions for countries
that are similarly well off, and above the level of subsistence. It suggests that the
United States (18 tonnes of CO2 per capita in 2008) and Canada (16.3 tonnes)
are due greater per capita entitlements than the United Kingdom (8.5 tonnes)
or France (5.9 tonnes) (World Bank 2012). While this may seem controversial,
that impression is mitigated by the fact that there is no linear relationship
between emissions and entitlements. Thus, double emission levels do not
equate to double entitlements. This is especially so where the higher emitter
could reduce emissions simply by adopting many of the same practices as the
lower emitter, which would seem to be the case when comparing North
America and Europe. On reflection, there is nothing counterintuitive about
maintaining that North Americans are due some higher level of per capita
emissions than Europeans, at least in the medium term. The former would have
to bear a burden that the latter would not were they assigned identical emission
entitlements.
When it comes to settling the above entitlements, grandfathering is
especially significant because the main non-grandfathering consideration –
ability to pay – has less of a role. That consideration is crucial, however, when
considering the second role in international negotiations which grandfathering
may have, namely, that of settling the appropriate levels of emission reductions
for countries that are differently well off, but all above subsistence level.
Consider, then, how we should distribute emissions between the United
States ($47,020 gross national income (GNI) per capita purchasing power
parity (PPP) in 2010, 18 tonnes), the United Kingdom ($36,580, 8.5 tonnes),
the Russian Federation ($19,190, 12 tonnes), and Poland ($19,020, 8.3 tonnes)
(World Bank 2011, 2012). Grandfathering suggests that the United States
should be assigned the greatest emissions per capita, the Russian Federation
the second most, and the United Kingdom and Poland least. But this should be
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adjusted to account for ability to pay. The entitlements of the Russian
Federation and Poland should be increased to account for the fact that they
have much lower per capita income. This is certainly sufficient for Poland to
have a significantly greater per capita emissions entitlement, all things
considered, than the United Kingdom, and will narrow or eliminate the gap
between the all-things-considered per capita emission entitlements of the
United States and those of Russia. Again, this pattern of distribution is, on
reflection, intuitively plausible. Asking Poland to decrease her emissions to the
same extent as the UK reduction would fail to acknowledge that economic
benefits for the former, less rich country have more impact on welfare than do
economic benefits for the richer country. This all suggests that grandfathering
can play a role in a future emissions treaty by complementing the more
traditional climate ethics considerations of basic needs and ability to pay.
Conclusion
I have argued that grandfathering should be moderate, allowing that
grandfathering considerations are to be balanced against other moral
considerations; either transitional or permanent, depending on its justificatory
basis and pertinent facts; concerned with average emissions per year of life,
such that an agent’s percentage share of these equals the appropriate
percentage share of future entitlements; instrumentally justified, on the basis
of its empirically contingent support of intrinsic values; specifically justified on
the basis that it promotes overall utility by assigning more entitlements to
higher emitters who benefit more from each unit of entitlements than do low
emitters, and/or promotes egalitarian or prioritarian goals by assigning more
entitlements to higher emitters, who would otherwise be worse off; and applied
to international negotiations alongside basic needs and ability to pay.
These six claims are largely independent of each other. One might accept
any or all of the first four without accepting the more controversial fifth, which
relies on the marginal benefit argument, and the sixth, which relies on some
further contentions. I hope, therefore, to encourage political theorists and
applied philosophers to think about more appealing ways in which grand-
fathering might be formulated, even if they do not accept the specific argument
I present for it, or my specific application of it.
We are now in a position to return to the claim in the introduction that,
though theory has much to teach practice, it also has a little to learn. Both
actual agreements and proposals that are designed to be a realistic basis for
agreement contain a significant amount of grandfathering. By accident or
design, that feature reflects an important moral consideration that climate
ethicists almost invariably overlook. But this one advantage should not be
overstated. I do not, of course, endorse Kyoto as all justice required, nor do I
wholeheartedly subscribe to Contraction and Convergence. Both fail to give
sufficient weight to the non-grandfathering consideration of ability to pay
(even Contraction and Convergence gives the global poor only a fraction of the
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rich’s entitlement for many years), and Kyoto was too weak even to secure the
basic needs of those threatened by climate change.
What I suggest, then, is a meeting of theory and practice. The present
global pattern of emissions is patently unjust, and any plausible political theory
will recommend a major reduction in rich countries’ emissions. But the most
just distribution would retain slightly increased entitlements for high emitters
on account of their high emissions, even though those same agents are due far
fewer entitlements all things considered on account of their wealth and the
great need of others. Grandfathering properly construed is the friend of climate
justice, not its enemy.
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